WWII Area Bombing and the Importance of a Game Plan: how successful is US bombing of IS?

The relative success of the US-led bombing campaign against the Islamic State (IS) is hard to judge. Unsurprisingly, the Obama administration has claimed that the heavy bombardment of the Islamic extremists has caused considerable damage to their capacity to wage war. Yet, what criteria the administration is using to measure this apparent success (numbers killed, lack of collateral damage, infrastructural degradation, territorial gains) is unclear.

GPS-guided bombing means that intelligence gathering is as important as the military action itself

Targeted area bombing has now been a part of conventional warfare for some time; ever since WWI in fact. Successive perpetrators of this tactic have differed in their approach to bombing campaigns and used different means to assess its effectiveness.

One novel example of the degree to which governments theorise in a bid to implement the most effective bombing campaign comes from British Cabinet Office documents dating from 1942. Below is a reproduction of a letter written to Prime Minister Churchill by Lord Cherwell (a key proponent of area bombing), entitled ‘Estimation of Bombing Effect’:

Prime Minister,

The following seems a simple method of estimating what we could do by bombing Germany:-

Careful analysis of the effects of raids on Birmingham, Hull and elsewhere have shown that, on the average, 1 ton of bombs dropped on a built-up area demolishes 20-40 dwellings and turns 100-200 people out of house and home.

We know from our experience that we can count on nearly 14 operational sorties per bomber produced. The average lift of the bombers we are going to produce over the next 15 months will be about 3 tons. It follows that each of these bombers will in its lifetime drop about 40 tons of bombs. If these are dropped on built-up areas they will make 4,000-8,000 people homeless.

In 1938 over 22 million Germans lived in 58 towns of over 100,000 inhabitants, which, with modern equipment, should be easy to find and hit. Our forecast output of heavy bombers (including Wellingtons) between now and the middle of 1943 is about 10,000. If even half the total load of 10,000 bombers were dropped on the built-up areas of these 58 German towns the great majority of their inhabitants (about one-third of the German population) would be turned out of house and home.

Investigation seems to show that having one’s house demolished is most damaging to morale. People seem to mind it more than having their friends or even relatives killed. At Hull signs of strain were evident, though only one-tenth of the houses were demolished. On the above figures we should be able to do ten times as much harm to each of the 58 principal German towns. There seems little doubt that this would break the spirit of the people.

Luftwaffe bombing of Hull caused widespread destruction

Our calculations assume, of course, that we really get one-half of our bombs into built-up areas. On the other hand, no account is taken of the large-promised American production (6,000 heavy bombers in the period in question). Nor has regard been paid to the inevitable damage to factories, communications and such in these towns and the damage by fire, probably accentuated by break-down of public services.

Cherwell

This cold, scientific reasoning resonates with prophecy. Indeed, the RAF, backed by the USAAF, caused untold damage to German cities with their indiscriminate carpet bombing of both industrial and civilian areas. It is easy (and possibly fair) to crticise this callous approach, yet from a tactical viewpoint the strategy was a success and proved significant in ending the war in favour of the Allies.

Dresden ruined after Allied air raids

Whether the US has such a reasoned plan in place now – given that most officials say the degradation and destruction of IS will take several years – is not known. Operating in a completely different environment to the British in WWII, against a completely different enemy (where collateral damage must be avoided at all costs), means that the tactical similarities will be limited.

Foresight, however, is paramount. If the US-led coalition has not planned accordingly, a tactical manoeuvre mid-campaign may be required. Anything to avoid putting boots on the ground.

Source

CAB 80/35 National Archives http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C387258

The Overspill of Conflict: a comparison of American strategic bombing in Pakistan and Laos-Cambodia

Pakistan has reacted angrily to reports that Barack Obama will continue authorising American drone strikes in the tribal regions of Northwest Pakistan. Since the American invasion of Afghanistan, much of the Taliban hierarchy has fled across the Pakistani border, primarily into the Waziristan region. Here they have joined Al-Qaeda leaders supportive of their former regime, in addition to members of the Pakistani Taliban.

The American drone programme in Pakistan has accelerated enormously under the Obama administration and has achieved significant strategic success, wiping out large sections of the Al-Qaeda leadership and seriously weakening the preeminent terrorist group. Of course, such strategic victories have come at considerable “collateral” losses. Hundreds of innocent Pakistani civilians have been killed, a price forcibly paid for the enhancement of global security.

Civilian, as well as militant, deaths result from US drone strikes

 

This strategic bombing campaign, carried out in a country the United States is not at war with, is reminiscent of another highly controversial period in American history. During the Vietnam War, the US Air Force carpet-bombed Laos and Cambodia, both of whose official governments (the Kingdom of Laos and the Khmer Republic) were supposedly American allies. As with the War in Afghanistan, the conflict spilled over into these adjacent states. The Pathet Lao and the Khmer Rouge, operating in Laos and Cambodia respectively, lent support to the communist Vietcong and provided important supply routes for munitions destined to oppose American troops.

As is commonplace in Northwestern Pakistan today, the American bombing campaign beyond the official borders of conflict during the Vietnam War came at a significant human cost. Thousands of Cambodian and Laotian civilians, by no means all communists, were killed either by high explosives or herbicidal warfare. Even today, Laos and Cambodia remain plagued by Unexploded Bombs (UXB) and hundreds of farmers are maimed by the detonation of UXBs every year.

A UXO contamination map of Laos illuminates the lasting legacy of the American bombs

America did not win the Vietnam War and, indeed, it is hard to make a case against its defeat. This simple fact means that the human sacrifice of Laos and Cambodia was catastrophically futile and no justification can be made for the strategic bombing campaign in those countries (particularly knowing the subsequent success of the brutal Pathet Lao and Khmer Rouge in seizing control of their countries).

So, what of Afghanistan and Pakistan? Of course, we are not simply considering one enemy in this case, as we were with the communist forces of Southeast Asia. The American targets in Pakistan are twofold; Taliban and Al-Qaeda. That said, when American withdraws from Afghanistan in the coming couple of years, how will the success of the drone campaign be judged? Will it be on the difficulty of the Taliban retaking control of Afghanistan, something many analysts think is a foregone conclusion? Or will it be on the continuing decline in the potency of Al-Qaeda? Indeed, it is likely that even after America’s forces withdraw from Afghanistan, the drone strikes will persist.

The legacy of the predator drone will take years to assess

 

The relative decline of Al-Qaeda is not to be sniffed at. Drone strikes have taken affect by crippling the group’s leadership (in conjunction with the infamous Abbottobad raid). Who is to say that without these strikes, thousands more civilians would be lying dead in the streets of the Western world?

However, the exchange of innocent civilian lives in Pakistan for potential civilian lives in the West is an unfair one. It is this sort of arrogant and brazen behaviour that has failed America in the past. After all, the term “hearts and minds” received its first real credence during the Vietnamese War as the Americans lost the faith of the local people with campaigns such as those conducted in Laos and Cambodia.

For peace and security in the Middle East, the Americans need to engage in a constructive multilateral dialogue with regional powers that negates the endangering of innocent lives wherever possible. I do not doubt the difficulty of this endeavour, and am convinced that drone strikes are only authorised on the assumption that civilian casualties will be minimised, but the Americans can’t do it alone. They need the support of Pakistan, whose government desperately needs to start acting with the responsibility incumbent of its stature and, in particular, tribal leaders in Waziristan to avoid a repeat of Vietnam where the spillover of conflict into virgin warzones seriously damaged the credibility of the occupying American forces. How attainable, and desirable, this scenario is for the Americans remains to be seen.