#ZumaMustFall: Time for South African President to Go; But What Next?

Finally thousands of South Africans have taken to the streets to demand the ousting of their inept, corrupt and incorrigible President Jacob Zuma. It has taken some of the grossest economic mismanagement in African history – yes it is really that bad – for the popular tide to turn completely against the former African National Congress (ANC) warrior, his recent juggling of Finance Ministers the final straw in a tale of woe that has seen unemployment reach 25%.

South Africans rally against Zuma
South Africans rally against Zuma

Despite the popular discontent, Zuma retains support within the ANC itself. This is hardly surprising given that his rule has been characterised by cronyism and bribery, with his closest allies unlikely to desert a man who provides them with an income completely incompatible with their limited capabilities.

Just a few months ago I blogged about the rising popularity of Julius Malema and his Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) who appear to offer black South Africans the only real alternative – albeit one based on mindless logic and dubious promises – to the decaying ANC.

Put simply, the lives of ordinary South Africans, regardless of race, have degraded drastically since Apartheid ended. Reverse discrimination has failed and the ANC has proved itself incapable of maintaining the legitimacy of South Africa on the international stage, despite the institutional and economic base put in place by its white predecessors.

Zuma's tenure has coincided with a decrease in international respect for South Africa
Zuma’s tenure has coincided with a decrease in international respect for South Africa

Malema must be laughing and white South Africans must be in despair, along with millions of others who continue their struggles against poverty, AIDS, lack of education, shortage of quality housing and security alone.

Below is a reminder of my previous post, with Malema’s rise now only likely to hasten, particularly if the ANC stubbornly supports its moronic and corrupt patron President.

ANC Failures Hasten Malema Rise: White South Africans Prepare for Exodus

Julius Malema drew thousands of supporters to his Economic Freedom March earlier this week, continuing his incision into the support of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) whose faltering performance, corrupt tendencies and listless leadership have led to widespread protests across the country.

Malema at the Economic Freedom March
Malema at the Economic Freedom March

Whatever the faults of the ANC – and there are many within the Jacob Zuma administration – growing support for Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is an alarming development, particularly if you happen to be a white South African. Malema has made no secret of his desire to completely disenfranchise the white population in favour of the blacks, advocating a raft of ridiculous economic policies likely to send South Africa back to the Dark Ages.

Left-wing struggles are not new in South Africa. In 1919, the Industrial & Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) launched in Cape Town to provide a radical political vehicle for labour reform (regardless of race) and they were joined in 1921 by the South African Communist Party (SACP). These two groups provided a more effective opposition to white minority rule than the ANC did during the early days of protest.

The ICU pursued a populist mandate which neglected effective labour organisation
The ICU pursued a populist mandate which neglected effective labour organisation

Although the ICU was a short-lived organisation, the SACP would later align itself with the ANC as one of the foremost opponent groups of Apartheid. Indeed, the SACP actively encouraged and organised some of the earliest anti-pass book protests and bus boycotts in South African cities and townships during World War Two (WWII).

Of course the ANC would later be painted as communists by the ruling National Party (NP) in an attempt to retain the political backing, and economic support, of their Western allies. There was certainly a conflation of ideas and endeavour between the ANC and SACP. Indeed, longtime SACP leader Joe Slovo was one of the most prominent anti-Apartheid campaigners and a commander of the militant Umkhonto we Sizwe wing of the ANC.

Through a combination of militant violence, international lobbying and political and social persuasion, these ‘left-wing’ groups helped bring about the fall of Apartheid.

These groups were, however, fighting against an unjust and repressive political system. Malema and his EFF seek to topple the democratically-elected ANC so that they can use the levers of power to punish the whites. Should the EFF ever displace the ANC then there will be a repeat of Mugabe’s Zimbabwe in South Africa.

Robert Mugabe has allowed blacks to seize white farms in Zimbabwe, destroying productivity in the process
Robert Mugabe has allowed blacks to seize white farms in Zimbabwe, destroying productivity in the process

The ANC has performed a wholly inadequate role in the post-Apartheid era. In a desperate attempt to reverse the racial discrimination of the Apartheid era, they have progressed too swiftly and with tragic results. Few incentives remain for white businessmen and farmers to stay in the country and yet they are the ones with the experience, capital and organisation to provide a sound economic basis for the country. The blacks, because of their stifled development under Apartheid, do not have the same economic capacity and this scenario will not improve if they are simply handed rewards without work (something Malema is keen to extend beyond the current ANC policy).

City centres have become slums and impoverishment amongst the black population has increased under the ANC’s watch. Why? Because its leaders are more interested in lining their own pockets and protecting their own business and political interests than improving the lot of their people, a sad fact common across the African continent.

The once-trendy district of Hillbrow in Johannesburg is now a crime-ridden slum
The once-trendy district of Hillbrow in Johannesburg is now a crime-ridden slum

It is therefore understandable that Malema and his populist rhetoric have struck a chord with poor black South Africans. Undoubtedly, should he ever attain political office he is likely to go the same way as Jacob Zuma and all those other self-serving ‘freedom fighters’ he claims to revile.

More worryingly, however, is the fact that he will plunge South Africa into anarchy, sealing its economic fate and driving out the remaining few whites who have resisted the racist policies and declining opportunities of the past few years to contribute what they can to the country that they love.

ANC Failures Hasten Malema Rise: White South Africans Prepare for Exodus

Julius Malema drew thousands of supporters to his Economic Freedom March earlier this week, continuing his incision into the support of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) whose faltering performance, corrupt tendencies and listless leadership have led to widespread protests across the country.

Malema at the Economic Freedom March
Malema at the Economic Freedom March

Whatever the faults of the ANC – and there are many within the Jacob Zuma administration – growing support for Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is an alarming development, particularly if you happen to be a white South African. Malema has made no secret of his desire to completely disenfranchise the white population in favour of the blacks, advocating a raft of ridiculous economic policies likely to send South Africa back to the Dark Ages.

Left-wing struggles are not new in South Africa. In 1919, the Industrial & Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) launched in Cape Town to provide a radical political vehicle for labour reform (regardless of race) and they were joined in 1921 by the South African Communist Party (SACP). These two groups provided a more effective opposition to white minority rule than the ANC did during the early days of protest.

The ICU pursued a populist mandate which neglected effective labour organisation
The ICU pursued a populist mandate which neglected effective labour organisation

Although the ICU was a short-lived organisation, the SACP would later align itself with the ANC as one of the foremost opponent groups of Apartheid. Indeed, the SACP actively encouraged and organised some of the earliest anti-pass book protests and bus boycotts in South African cities and townships during World War Two (WWII).

Of course the ANC would later be painted as communists by the ruling National Party (NP) in an attempt to retain the political backing, and economic support, of their Western allies. There was certainly a conflation of ideas and endeavour between the ANC and SACP. Indeed, longtime SACP leader Joe Slovo was one of the most prominent anti-Apartheid campaigners and a commander of the militant Umkhonto we Sizwe wing of the ANC.

Through a combination of militant violence, international lobbying and political and social persuasion, these ‘left-wing’ groups helped bring about the fall of Apartheid.

These groups were, however, fighting against an unjust and repressive political system. Malema and his EFF seek to topple the democratically-elected ANC so that they can use the levers of power to punish the whites. Should the EFF ever displace the ANC then there will be a repeat of Mugabe’s Zimbabwe in South Africa.

Robert Mugabe has allowed blacks to seize white farms in Zimbabwe, destroying productivity in the process
Robert Mugabe has allowed blacks to seize white farms in Zimbabwe, destroying productivity in the process

The ANC has performed a wholly inadequate role in the post-Apartheid era. In a desperate attempt to reverse the racial discrimination of the Apartheid era, they have progressed too swiftly and with tragic results. Few incentives remain for white businessmen and farmers to stay in the country and yet they are the ones with the experience, capital and organisation to provide a sound economic basis for the country. The blacks, because of their stifled development under Apartheid, do not have the same economic capacity and this scenario will not improve if they are simply handed rewards without work (something Malema is keen to extend beyond the current ANC policy).

City centres have become slums and impoverishment amongst the black population has increased under the ANC’s watch. Why? Because its leaders are more interested in lining their own pockets and protecting their own business and political interests than improving the lot of their people, a sad fact common across the African continent.

The once-trendy district of Hillbrow in Johannesburg is now a crime-ridden slum
The once-trendy district of Hillbrow in Johannesburg is now a crime-ridden slum

It is therefore understandable that Malema and his populist rhetoric have struck a chord with poor black South Africans. Undoubtedly, should he ever attain political office he is likely to go the same way as Jacob Zuma and all those other self-serving ‘freedom fighters’ he claims to revile.

More worryingly, however, is the fact that he will plunge South Africa into anarchy, sealing its economic fate and driving out the remaining few whites who have resisted the racist policies and declining opportunities of the past few years to contribute what they can to the country that they love.

From Sharpeville to Soweto to Marikana: the difficult legacies of South Africa’s massacres

The fallout from the 2012 Marikana  massacre continues with the South African police chief refusing to accept the conclusions of a judge-led inquiry that placed the blame for the deaths of 34 miners on her officers.

Police swoop in after the Marikana Massacre Source: Praag
Police swoop in after the Marikana Massacre
Source: Praag

The deadliest event since democracy took hold in 1994, Marikana has become a name almost as infamous as Sharpeville and Soweto, the scenes of two notorious mass killings during the Apartheid era.

What were the repercussions of the Sharpeville Massacre and the Soweto Uprising? And what can we expect after Marikana?

The state response to the peaceful black protests in Sharpeville on March 21st 1960 was particularly violent and unforgiving. In the immediate aftermath of the incident the state had set the standard they would follow in crushing black resistance. This would lead to the most significant repercussion of Sharpeville; the increased entrenchment of white National Party (NP) power. By declaring a state of emergency a week after the massacre, the government began to initiate violent repression against any political agitator and mass arrests totalled over 11,000 in 156 days.[1] They simultaneously outlawed the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)[2], the greatest organised challenge to white rule, to further enhance the dominance of the state. Furthermore, security measures were tightened by the NP and over the following few years thousands more of the black population were detained and convicted for being affiliated with banned organisations.[3] All this ensured that any black uprising immediately after the Sharpeville emergency was never allowed to gather any momentum and that the government was always in control of the situation. The NP also looked to ensure their domination through legal acts such as the “Bantu in European Areas” bill of October 1960, which gave state authorities even more control over black urban populations.[4]

The aftermath of Sharpeville Source: The Guardian
The aftermath of Sharpeville
Source: The Guardian

As with Sharpeville in 1960, the NP government responded brutally to the Soweto Uprising of June 1976, with 4,000 injured in the subsequent eight months.[5] Additionally, the government tried to ban any black political organisations, as they had in 1960, which resulted in several such outfits associated with the influential Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) being declared illegal over the next year.[6] However, despite the immediate police response to the Soweto uprising, the government clampdown on the protests and black resistance was not nearly as swift and ruthless as it had been after Sharpeville. It is argued that Vorster remained very subdued for the ten weeks following June 1976 allowing black resistance to gain the momentum that Verwoerd didn’t allow in 1960.[7] Therefore, it is crucial to examine the individual leadership of the two Prime Ministers in order to understand why the repercussions of two similar events were eventually so different.

Schoolchildren flee during the Soweto Uprising  Source: Sharpeye
Schoolchildren flee during the Soweto Uprising
Source: Sharpeye

Verwoerd’s response to the Sharpeville emergency was immediate with the banning of the black organisations and declaration of a state of emergency. Furthermore, Verwoerd quickly tried to justify the actions of the state by forcing a retraction from the Dutch Reformed Church after their condemnation of the event.[8] This helped him maintain popular white support for his policies and resulted in greater white unity and increased NP support throughout the 1960s.[9] At the same time Verwoerd managed to create Party unity despite there being obvious divisions amongst some of its members. Whilst Verwoerd recovered from an assassination attempt, his acting Prime Minister Sauer publicly called for reform of apartheid policy to allow blacks more autonomy.[10] However, on his return to duty Verwoerd quickly made clear his intention to refuse any concessions to the black population and with the support of the NP federal council, quietened the reformists within his government.[11] This created a strong, united white government supported by the majority of the white populace, which left any black resistance few weaknesses to target within the state.

Apartheid's chief proponent, Hendrik Verwoerd Source: SA History
Apartheid’s chief proponent, Hendrik Verwoerd
Source: SA History

The ability of Verwoerd to unite the NP in the months after March 1960 was not matched by Vorster in the months following the Soweto uprising. Vorster’s inability to justify the state’s actions in June 1976 under increasing international fury led many of the white population to begin to question their invincibility.[12] Unlike Verwoerd after Sharpeville who increased support for the NP, Vorster and his successor Botha saw NP support decrease from 82 per cent in October 1976 to 56 per cent in October 1982.[13] This was in large part down to the NP split that occurred in 1982, which was a repercussion of the government reform initiated after the Soweto riots. As the rioting continued for some time after the Soweto uprising, new Prime Minister Botha realised that by 1978 some amendment to apartheid policy was necessary.[14] Consequently tentative efforts at reform were implemented, unlike after Sharpeville, with increased opportunity for black private property in urban areas and additional education funding.[15] However, the reforms were fairly limited so that only a minority of the black urban elite benefited and led to renewed black protests for reform across the country in 1979 and 1980.[16] At the same time, Botha also alienated a large portion of the NP who was against any reform that would undermine the position of the Afrikaners. This division would prevent decisive action being taken by the government to completely halt black resistance after Soweto and instead of achieving unity, led to the breakaway of NP members to form the Conservative Party in 1982.[17]

Verwoerd’s unwavering policy was also important for the NP in resisting the international condemnation and economic withdrawal from South Africa that was a vitally important repercussion of the Sharpeville emergency. “For many people in the world…the Sharpeville massacre was the first time they became aware what sort of government South Africa had.”[18] UN resolutions of condemnation and a voluntary arms embargo from a few nations threatened to isolate South Africa in the international community.[19] However, Verwoerd was unmoved by the worldwide criticism and refused to reform his policies; putting the state at odds with the Commonwealth that South Africa was a member of. To prevent continuing criticism, Verwoerd withdrew from the Commonwealth and held an all-white referendum that chose to make South Africa a republic.[20] This act gave the NP greater independence to carry out their apartheid policies and allowed Verwoerd to set about stabilising the state so that he could begin to draw positive foreign interest back to South Africa.

The international anti-apartheid movement gathered real momentum after the Soweto Uprising Source: The Guardian
The international anti-apartheid movement gathered real momentum after the Soweto Uprising
Source: The Guardian

The global response to the Soweto uprising was similar to that in 1960, yet more severe, with “a chorus of international voices damning South African racism.”[21] As with the aftermath of the Sharpeville emergency, UN sanctions were quickly imposed on South Africa, except this time they were mandatory. The sanctions after Sharpeville were only voluntary and were indeed ignored by countries that had major interests in South Africa. Nevertheless, by 1977 there was a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa, which was also excluded from the UN and the ILO, as well as several other International Organisations.[22] The harsh sanctions were argued for by the worldwide anti-apartheid campaign that had gained full momentum by 1976. This movement was initiated predominantly by the many black and white South Africans who emigrated from the country in horror at the Sharpeville emergency sixteen years earlier,[23] showing how the repercussions of the Soweto uprising were grounded in the after effects of Sharpeville.

As a result of this increased international pressure, Vorster’s government was left in a weakened state that was being preserved in the main through brutal repression of any opposition under the Terrorism Act, which was responsible for the death of prominent BCM leader Steve Biko.[24] This only increased South Africa’s international alienation and was compounded by the rapid withdrawal of foreign capital from the country, which the South African economy relied on so much.[25] Again, this repercussion of the Soweto uprising was not a new phenomenon, as there was a temporary removal of foreign investment from South Africa during the period of unrest that followed the Sharpeville emergency.[26] Nevertheless, the brutally efficient state action initiated by Verwoerd after March 1960 led to an almost complete stabilisation of the state at the time of the Rivonia arrests in 1963.[27] Consequently, “foreign investors responded by rewarding the reimposition of political authority rather than penalising the intensification of repression.”[28] There was too much to be gained for investors to stay out of South Africa and consequently UK businesses alone invested R1, 200m throughout the 1960s.[29] As a result, it can be argued that one of the repercussions of Sharpeville was that foreign investment increased in the long-term, as the emergency and its aftermath drew attention to how important South Africa was to foreign business interests.

The Rivonia Trial helped reassure foreign investors that South Africa was stable Source: ECR
The Rivonia Trial helped reassure foreign investors that South Africa was stable
Source: ECR

Unlike after Sharpeville, many of the foreign investors who withdrew from South Africa after the Soweto uprising didn’t return, as overseas alternatives, mass emigration and moral outrage at the apartheid regime took its toll.[30] Once more, the long-term repercussions of Sharpeville can be seen, as vast numbers of businessmen tried in 1960 to highlight the importance of giving concessions to black workers so that the South African economy could survive if foreign investment didn’t return.[31] Luckily for them it did in the 1960s but post-Soweto was different and despite some vain attempts from businesses to establish an Urban Foundation after 1976 to improve the quality of life for black workers[32], it was too late. The failure of the government of the 1960s to concede to some reform therefore indirectly led to an economic downturn in the late 1970s, leaving South Africa reliant on unpredictable gold prices.[33] With the NP worried about the end of white domination and decolonisation in the states to the north,[34] the government faced both internal and external threats in the late 1970s. In turn, with an economic slump and increasing emigration, supporting the necessary security forces for the defence of white rule was becoming increasingly difficult.

The crisis in the NP government after the Soweto uprising would contribute to the return of armed action by the ANC in South Africa for the first time in thirteen years.[35] The organisation’s prolonged absence from the political scene in South Africa was a direct repercussion of the Sharpeville emergency when along with the PAC, they were outlawed. The ruthless suppression of any non-violent ANC protest after Sharpeville led their members to the realisation that they needed to revise their tactics, with Nelson Mandela remarking in 1961: “this closes a chapter in our methods of political action.”[36] Here Mandela hinted at a more militant form of resistance, which became apparent with large-scale ANC sabotage operations against government targets in the early 1960s.[37] With the formation of the militant Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) wing of the ANC in 1961[38] and continued PAC violence against white civilians[39] it was clear that the black resistance movement had left peaceful protest behind. However, the Verwoerd government’s efficient and vicious preservation of the state meant that by the time of the Rivonia arrests of 1963, most black organisation members were either imprisoned or exiled. Whilst this led to over a decade of unparalleled white supremacy in South Africa, the long-term consequences of the government’s actions against the resistance movement after Sharpeville would come back to haunt the NP in the years after 1976.

Source: QU South Africa
Source: QU South Africa

Whilst neither of the banned black political resistance organisations was responsible for the Soweto uprising, those that participated provided the ANC in particular with a level of grassroots support that would help them re-launch their campaign within South Africa.[40] Furthermore, “the 1976 uprising marked an important turning point in the generational balance of power in Soweto, as in other urban areas.”[41] The rise to prominence of black urban youths in the resistance movement after Soweto energised the protests against white domination. Additionally, it created huge problems for the NP government. With the resistance campaign now being channelled through the schools, it wasn’t as simple as banning political organisations, as in 1960, because there was now a much wider and far-reaching base of support. Whilst the government responded with the same brutality as in 1960 to the protests, many students and young men managed to flee South Africa where they were gladly accepted by the ANC in exile.[42]

Here it is clear to see how both a long-term repercussion of Sharpeville and a short-term repercussion of Soweto combined to significant effect. During their exile as a result of the post-Sharpeville government banning, the ANC had significantly improved their organisation and structure abroad. As a result of students fleeing detention after the Soweto uprising, the ANC were able to incorporate vast new numbers of support for militant training at their bases in Zambia, Tanzania and Angola.[43] This gave the ANC the potential to return to guerrilla operations in the South African interior, which had appeared impossible in the 1960s. Furthermore, the ANC was even drawing support from students who had been arrested during the Soweto riots, as a repercussion of a disastrous error of judgement on the part of the South African security forces. By imprisoning many of the radical students on Robben Island, the South African government inadvertently created “the site of an extraordinary program of political education.”[44] The prisoners became “educated” in ANC ideology and militant tactics by the likes of Mandela, Govan Mbeki and Walter Sisulu who were incarcerated on Robben Island,[45] as a result of their increasingly violent methods after the Sharpeville emergency. Therefore, rather than quashing the militant sentiments of many of the urban youth, the government facilitated their development as agitators against the state.

Robben Island became a political training camp for its inmates Source: Daily Telegraph (1964)
Robben Island became a political training camp for its inmates
Source: Daily Telegraph (1964)

The government’s ineffective response to the Soweto uprising and the lasting legacy of the ANC in exile after Sharpeville were to have serious repercussions for the NP in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. A rapid emergence of black organisations across all walks of life after 1976 was typical of the new “militant political culture” that the uprising had caused.[46] These organisations would combine with existing student groups and “graduates” from Robben Island to form an integral part of the United Democratic Front (UDF),[47] which would channel resistance against the state throughout the 1980s and play a crucial part in the downfall of apartheid.[48] Students of the BCM looked to the ANC to organise their struggle[49] and the ANC in turn developed the student’s influences into a more united vision of liberation. These students in particular would become important leaders in the UDF[50], initiating a united black resistance movement against an ever divided and weakened government.

Although the NP tried to implement a “total strategy” in 1978 to coordinate state activities against a “total onslaught,”[51] the black resistance movement had gained the momentum that Verwoerd had not allowed in the early 1960s. Indeed, whilst the security forces intensified their violence against the resistance movement in the 1980s and early 1990s[52] the damage had been done by the results of the Soweto uprising. In the face of an increasingly furious worldwide anti-apartheid campaign, a united black resistance movement and more reformist cabinet members, white domination continued to erode after Soweto until finally, in 1994, it came to an end.

De Klerk and Mandela: the end of Apartheid Source: Daily Telegraph
De Klerk and Mandela: the end of Apartheid
Source: Daily Telegraph

As Deon Geldenhuys correctly surmises, Soweto “displayed many of the features of the Sharpeville crisis of 1960, only in more acute form.”[53] Whilst the Verwoerd government’s response in 1960 helped initiate over a decade of complete white superiority, the government response after 1976 helped facilitate a strong resistance movement that would ultimately contribute to the downfall of apartheid. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to completely blame the government of 1976 for its own downfall. Some of the repercussions of Sharpeville only surfaced after the Soweto uprising. The ANC returned from exile better trained and organised, the unreformed economy suffered greatly with the large withdrawal of foreign capital in 1976 and international opposition to apartheid peaked due mainly to those activists who emigrated after the Sharpeville massacre. Therefore, the crisis for the government in the late 1970s can be seen as a consequence both of the short-term repercussions of the Soweto uprising and the long-term repercussions of Sharpeville, as the two are heavily interlinked. However, it is also difficult to see Verwoerd’s government contributing to their own downfall in the way Vorster’s and Botha’s did, as their slow and ineffective response to growing black momentum certainly contributed to the severity of the repercussions of Soweto.

 

The immediate repercussion of the Marikana massacre was the exposure of fault lines within the black community and the explicit recognition that for many black Africans post-Apartheid life has not yielded the promised rewards.

With the white man blameless, a period of introspection should have been undertaken. However, the ANC government of Jacob Zuma has become increasingly detached from the people, a self-justifying regime incapable of bringing about real change.

The massacre was the result of both a challenge to the unhappy status quo and a heavy-handed response by a Police force overwhelmed by insecurities in a nation that is bordering on anarchy such is the crime rate.

The report into the massacre and the response it has generated will not lead to any immediate changes. Yet there is hope that the disagreements will open up channels for public discussion about the status of black South Africans more than two decades into the democratic era. Simultaneously, it should raise questions about why the Police responded with such brutality and whether this a systemic fault brought about by the uncontrolled levels of violence that continue to ravage this amazing country.

 

Endnotes

 

[1] M. Murray, South Africa: time of agony, time of destiny: the upsurge of popular protest (London, 1987) p. 242

[2] W. Beinart, Twentieth-century South Africa (2nd edn., Oxford, 2001) p. 166

[3] D. Welsh, ‘The executive and the African population: 1948 to the present’, in R. Schrire (ed.), Malan to De Klerk: leadership in the apartheid state (London, 1994) p. 162

[4] D. Posel, The making of apartheid, 1948-1961: conflict and compromise (Oxford, 1997) p. 245

[5] S. Ellis & T. Sechaba, Comrades against apartheid: the ANC & the South African Communist Party in exile (London, 1992) p. 82

[6] J. Seekings, The UDF: a history of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991 (Cape Town: Oxford, 2000) p. 30

[7] D. Welsh, ‘The executive and the African population: 1948 to the present’, in R. Schrire (ed.), Malan to De Klerk: leadership in the apartheid state (London, 1994) p. 173

[8] H. Giliomee, ‘The leader and the citizenry’, in R. Schrire (ed.), Malan to De Klerk: leadership in the apartheid state (London, 1994)  p.108

[9] Ibid., p.113

[10] D. Posel, The making of apartheid, 1948-1961: conflict and compromise (Oxford, 1997) pp. 238-9

[11] M. Lipton, Capitalism and apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986 (Aldershot, 1986) p. 301

[12] S. Johns & R. Hunt Davis Jnr., Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress: the struggle against apartheid, 1948-1990: a documentary survey (New York; Oxford, 1991) p. 189

[13] C. Charney, ‘Class conflict and the National Party split’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 10 (1984) p. 274

[14] T.R.H. Davenport & C. Saunders, South Africa: a modern history (5th edn., Basingstoke, 2000) p.459

[15] W. Beinart, Twentieth-century South Africa (2nd edn., Oxford, 2001) pp.245-6

[16] Ibid., pp.247-9

[17] G.H.L. Le May, The Afrikaners: an historical interpretation (Oxford, 1995)

[18] S. Ellis & T. Sechaba, Comrades against apartheid: the ANC & the South African Communist Party in exile (London, 1992) p. 30

[19] M. Lipton, Capitalism and apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986 (Aldershot, 1986) pp. 29-30

[20] D. Geldenhuys, ‘The head of government and South Africa’s foreign relations’, in R. Schrire (ed.), Malan to De Klerk: leadership in the apartheid state (London, 1994)  p. 263

[21] A. Ashforth, The politics of official discourse in twentieth-century South Africa (Oxford, 1990) p.196

[22] M. Lipton, Capitalism and apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986 (Aldershot, 1986) p. 346

[23] G. Mbeki, Learning from Robben Island: the prison writings of Govan Mbeki (London, 1991) p.168

[24] S. Johns & R. Hunt Davis Jnr., Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress: the struggle against apartheid, 1948-1990: a documentary survey (New York; Oxford, 1991) p. 189

[25] S. Ellis & T. Sechaba, Comrades against apartheid: the ANC & the South African Communist Party in exile (London, 1992) pp. 82-3

[26] D.T. McKinley, The ANC and the liberation struggle: a critical political biography (London, 1997) p.27

[27] S. Ellis & T. Sechaba, Comrades against apartheid: the ANC & the South African Communist Party in exile (London, 1992) p. 38

[28] W. Beinart, Twentieth-century South Africa (2nd edn., Oxford, 2001) p. 173

[29] G. Mbeki, Learning from Robben Island: the prison writings of Govan Mbeki (London, 1991) p.169

[30] D. Geldenhuys, ‘The head of government and South Africa’s foreign relations’, in R. Schrire (ed.), Malan to De Klerk: leadership in the apartheid state (London, 1994)  p. 274

[31] M. Lipton, Capitalism and apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986 (Aldershot, 1986) p. 301

[32] A. Ashforth, The politics of official discourse in twentieth-century South Africa (Oxford, 1990) p.200

[33] T.R.H. Davenport & C. Saunders, South Africa: a modern history (5th edn., Basingstoke, 2000) p.460

[34] W. Beinart, Twentieth-century South Africa (2nd edn., Oxford, 2001) pp. 243-44

[35] H. Barrell, ‘The turn to the masses: the African National Congress’s strategic review of 1978-9’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 18 (1992) p. 72

[36] D.T. McKinley, The ANC and the liberation struggle: a critical political biography (London, 1997) p.28

[37] Y. Muthien, ‘Protest and resistance in Cape Town, 1939-1965’, in R. Cohen et al. (eds.), Repression and resistance: insider accounts of apartheid (London, 1990) p. 74

[38] S. Ellis & T. Sechaba, Comrades against apartheid: the ANC & the South African Communist Party in exile (London, 1992) p. 32

[39] Y. Muthien, ‘Protest and resistance in Cape Town, 1939-1965’, in R. Cohen et al. (eds.), Repression and resistance: insider accounts of apartheid (London, 1990) p. 74

[40] H. Barrell, ‘The turn to the masses: the African National Congress’s strategic review of 1978-9’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 18 (1992) p. 77

[41] C. Glaser, ‘ “We must infiltrate the Tsotsis”: school politics and youth gangs in Soweto, 1968-1976’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 24 (1998) p. 318

[42] M. Lipton, Capitalism and apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986 (Aldershot, 1986) p. 346

[43] S. Johns & R. Hunt Davis Jnr., Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress: the struggle against apartheid, 1948-1990: a documentary survey (New York; Oxford, 1991) p. 191

[44] P. Gready, ‘Autobiography and the “Power of Writing”: political prison writing in the apartheid era’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 19 (1993) p. 518

[45] D.T. McKinley, The ANC and the liberation struggle: a critical political biography (London, 1997) p.48

[46] J. Seekings, The UDF: a history of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991 (Cape Town: Oxford, 2000) p. 29

[47] M. Murray, South Africa: time of agony, time of destiny: the upsurge of popular protest (London, 1987) p. 197

[48] W. Beinart, Twentieth-century South Africa (2nd edn., Oxford, 2001) pp. 251-2

[49] J. Seekings, The UDF: a history of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991 (Cape Town: Oxford, 2000) p. 30

[50] S. Ellis & T. Sechaba, Comrades against apartheid: the ANC & the South African Communist Party in exile (London, 1992) p. 83

[51] M. Swilling & M. Phillips, ‘State power in the 1980s: from “total strategy” to “counter-revolutionary warfare”’, in J. Cock & L. Nathan (eds.), War and society: the militarisation of South Africa (Cape Town, 1989) pp. 135-6

[52] S. Ellis, ‘The historical significance of South Africa’s Third Force’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 24 (1998) p. 263

[53] D. Geldenhuys, ‘The head of government and South Africa’s foreign relations’, in R. Schrire (ed.), Malan to De Klerk: leadership in the apartheid state (London, 1994)  pp. 273-4

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