Turkey in Europe: an uncomfortable presence?

Is Turkey a part of Europe? It is a question that confuses and divides both those within and outside the large Islamic country that straddles two continents. Certainly, the history of the Turkish people is very much intertwined with European affairs, ever since the Ottoman Empire’s expansionist strides in the fifteenth century. Yet for many Europeans, the presence of Turkey in “their” lands is something to be feared, or at least be sceptical about. Nowhere is this clearer than in France.

The French, and to a lesser extent the Germans, are the biggest obstacle to Turkey’s European Union accession. The Turks’ membership proposal has been on the table for several years yet has been consistently ignored by the French, whose politicians and citizens see Turkey as too big, too poor and too Muslim to join. Now, another flashpoint in relations between the two countries has emerged that threatens to destabilise Turkey’s bid for EU membership even further. The French parliament has passed a law making it illegal to deny the “genocide” of the Armenian people perpetrated by the Turks in 1915-16. Widely seen as a policy meant to win President Sarkozy the support of the half-million ethnic Armenians living in France for next year’s election, the Turks have responded with abject fury. Recalling their ambassador from Paris, freezing military cooperation with the French and threatening potential economic sanctions is the Turkish government’s response to what they call an assault on their country’s national identity. They deny that the mass killings and deportation of Armenians was genocide, suggesting rather that it was a sad consequence of the First World War.

The Turks have also been eager to point out the reliance of Europe in general, and France in particular, on their booming economy as part of the Eurozone recovery. Some MPs of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party are even asking whether Turkey needs further integration with Europe. What seems clear, not only in France and Turkey but also in the rest of Europe, is that there is a general unease about Turkish Europeanisation. This deeply-embedded mistrust stems from Turkey’s historical role on the continent, which has often run contrary to the interests of the predominantly-Christian states to the west. Whilst this historical legacy lingers, Turkey’s place in Europe will never be fully-accepted.

 

The Ottomans

The Turks burst onto the European scene with the capture of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453, ending the Byzantine Empire and with it the last remnants of the great Roman Empire, a bastion of Christendom for over a millennium. This was only the beginning of the Ottoman expansion. During the course of the sixteenth century, marshalled by their brilliant sultan Suleiman, the Ottomans conquered large swathes of Christian Europe, including Belgrade, Rhodes and much of Hungary. Furthermore, they annexed significant lands in the Middle East, including Jerusalem in 1517, a city long coveted by the Christians.

The fall of Constantinople in 1453 marked the beginning of Turkish engagement in Europe

Not only did this aggressive policy of territorial acquisition deal a religious and political blow to Western Europe, but it also had severe economic repercussions. The Ottomans’ control of the traditional caravan trading routes through to Central and Eastern Asia cut off the Europeans from some of their most profitable markets. Although this would ultimately encourage the Age of Exploration and Discovery that led Spain and Portugal to the New World and India by sea, it proved a downfall for many European states. The Italian republics of Venice and Genoa, long commanders of the Mediterranean and Oriental trade routes, began their fall into decline. Meanwhile the central Germanic states became isolated, exacerbating the religious tension already brewing under the Protestant Reformation.

The Ottoman Turks offered a severe challenge to Christian ascendency in Europe, advancing as far as Vienna and the northern tip of Africa. Only the combined forces of the Holy Roman Empire and the other Catholic states of Europe prevented the Islamic march progressing further. Consequently, the legacy of the Turks’ first appearance in Europe is one of religious warfare, economic undermining and political conquest. Whilst the Ottomans indirectly played a role in the creation of the great European colonial empires through their domination of traditional trade routes, they were overwhelmingly responsible for the destruction of Christian kingdoms and cultural artefacts that history makes hard to forget.

It would take the corruption of the Ottoman Sultans and a resurgence of Western and Central European power, brought about by colonial exploitation and industrialisation, to halt the Turkish challenge for European supremacy. Even so, the Ottomans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are still revered amongst some Turks for their show of Islamic power and cultural and political expansion. Such sentiments of invoking Ottoman power are unlikely to improve the Turkish image in the minds of sceptical Europeans, particularly those well-versed in modern history.

 

World War I

By the time the First World War broke out in 1914, the Ottoman Empire was in its death throes. With its territories having diminished to just a few areas of the Middle East and its leadership increasingly unstable, much of present-day Turkey was severely impoverished.

However, despite their restrictions, the Turks joined the War on the side of the Central Powers in October 1914 after signing the Ottoman-German Alliance. The key motivator for the Ottoman’s involvement in the War was territorial. Having been openly competing with Russia for supremacy in Eastern Europe and Central Asia for several decades, the Turks were determined to prevent the Tsarist forces assuming control over the strategically-important Bosporus and Dardanelles. These two straits were crucial in connecting Europe and Asia, both in terms of trade and with regards to naval deployment. The Russians had long coveted the straits. The Ottomans, however, were determined not to lose these economic and political lifelines.

With their German alliance, the Ottomans found themselves at war with the other Entente Powers, Britain and France. In one of the most notorious battles of the war, the Turks slaughtered thousands of British and Australasian troops at Gallipoli in 1915 as part of their campaign to hold onto the Dardanelles. Unsurprisingly, such battles, even in the heat of war, are hard to forget and have become part of the Australian and New Zealander national consciousness in particular. Not only that, but the Turks earned themselves long-held resentment by Western European forces, whose war efforts were hampered by having to fight on an additional front. Considering the Ottomans were also in direct competition with Britain and France for territories in the Middle East, there was a resurgence in animosity towards the former marauders of Central Europe by politicians and civilians alike. This was particularly piquant given that the British and French had given thousands of lives to protect Turkish interests against the Russians during the Crimean War in the 1850s.

The Ottoman alliance with Germany had been a result of their desire to weaken Russia, rather than to embroil themselves with the French and British. However, after several victories against the Allies at the beginning of the war, it was the Russians who began to inflict defeats on the increasingly-beleaguered and under-provisioned Turks. During fighting in the Caucuses, Russia won several key battles against their Ottoman enemies. One particular phase of the campaign, fought in Anatolia, saw the beginning of the Turkish deportation of ethnic Armenians to other regions of their Empire, including Syria and Mesopotamia. An Armenian volunteer force had fought with the Russians, with whom they had greater cultural and religious affinities, and the Ottomans retaliated against the Armenian population, in what has come to be seen as an act of genocide.

Victims of the Armenian "Genocide"

It would take the Arab Revolt from 1916, where various Arab leaders sought to overthrow Turkish rule in the Middle East, for the Ottoman Empire to finally be brought to its knees. However, the Turks’ actions in the First World War left a legacy as bitter as the days of their brutal zenith. Aside from the atrocities of Armenia and the Gallipoli campaign, the Ottomans sought to use the War to their advantage against Western Europe. Whilst the Turks were not alone in their motives – the imperialist Russians were also highly culpable in this instance – the existing mistrust towards them after years of religious and political tension further ingrained them as enemies of the people of Western Europe. Any solidarity brought by the Crimean War had long been forgotten.

 

The Secular Turkish State

The First World War and the resulting Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) finally finished off the Ottoman Empire. In its place was a new secular Turkish state, headed by independence leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. With Turkey’s former Middle Eastern territories already handed over to the Allied Powers after the Treaty of Sevrés (1920), Atatürk set about creating an internal-looking Turkish state. He helped inspire a new sense of Turkish nationalism, withdrawn from the world around it, and quickly quashed any internal dissent.

Consequently, by the time the Second World War came around, the Turks were anything but eager to get involved. Atatürk had died in 1938 and his successor, İsmet İnönü, was determined to maintain Turkish neutrality during the War despite the desperate entreaties of the Allied and Axis powers for his support. Despite the arrival of an opportunity for Turkey to cement a positive future relationship with the rest of Europe, İnönü delayed Turkish entrance into the War until February 1945. Even then, it was little more than a ceremonious gesture to court Allied support in the future. Whilst Turkish neutrality was understandable given the previous horrors of the First World War under the Ottomans, an opportunity was missed to portray Turkey in a new light of responsibility, engaging positively with European affairs. Its status as an outsider was preserved.

Churchill and Roosevelt failed to garner İsmet İnönü's support at the 1943 Cairo Conference

Turkish neutrality was only completely revoked with its accession to NATO in 1952. This move was ostensibly an effort to prevent Stalin’s Soviets from making a move against the treasured Dardanelles and Bosporus once again. As a condition for joining NATO, the Turks were pressed into democratic reform. However, although the first multi-party elections in the country’s history had been held under İnönü in 1946, they were anything but free and fair. Therefore, come the 1950 election, with the world’s attention turned towards Turkey, İnönü had little choice but to behave himself. His party subsequently lost.

If this democratic transition was supposed to inspire a new positive era of Western European-Turkish relations, it was a sore disappointment. A 1960 coup d’état, in which İnönü supposedly conspired, led to the fall of the Democratic Party government. When the subsequent military junta returned power to the civilians in 1961, it was unsurprisingly İnönü’s Republican People’s Party that assumed leadership of the country. Elections were immediately held, in which the opposition leaders were imprisoned. It would take until 1965 before İnönü was eventually toppled for good. However, his determination to cling on to power had prevented the embedding of democratic values in a country now eager to engage with the rest of Europe.

With controversial attacks against the ethnic Kurds in Turkey’s eastern provinces persisting after the 1960s, and democracy still anything but entrenched, there was still little in common between the Turks and Western Europe. Despite closer economic integration and Turkish immigration to mainland Europe since then, the legacy of the Ottomans and two World Wars in which the Turks did little to endear themselves to the European people, has created the suspicions that exist today.

 

An EU with Turkish Membership?

Turkey’s historical role in Europe is problematic. For the most part, Turkish intervention in Europe has spelt trouble for the traditional political, economic and cultural hierarchies that exist there. Who’s to say that the same thing won’t result from Turkish EU membership? Admittedly, the days of rampaging Ottomans, conquering territory by land and sea, is not going to re-occur. However, with bureaucratic infighting already one of the EU’s biggest stumbling blocks, Turkish inclusion will surely only enhance the problem.

The reality is that French concerns are legitimate. Turkey is not like the rest of Europe. Indeed, in terms of culture and religion they could not be more distinctive, a worrying prospect considering the EU’s desire for peaceful integration of its multi-national population. There remains too much distrust between Western Europe, in particular, and the Turks, whose historical record is no antidote to existing tension.

Two points, however, are worth considering. Firstly, during the debate over the Armenian Genocide law this week, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé expressed anger at a motion he perceived would “kill off dialogue with the Turks”. He reminded his administration that “the Turks have just ordered 100 Airbuses [French manufactured] and there are 1,000 French companies doing business in Turkey”. Clearly, economic interdependence between the two nations is already well-established. Secondly, there has been a rising current of dissatisfaction amongst Turkish MPs towards the prospect of EU membership. Many now believe that, with the ongoing Eurozone crisis and antipathy towards their country, that Turkey would be better off retaining the status quo. Given that economic ties are already well-established, this renewed distaste for EU integration might be in the best interests of Turkey and the rest of Europe in general.

History and Film: an uneasy relationship

The power of film is no longer something to be marvelled at but simply something to be expected. The capacity for motion pictures to arouse emotive action and prompt spirited debate have long been recognised and used by individual directors and governments alike. Historical films often give exposure to events unknown, overlooked or forgotten by society. This can provoke a positive response by stimulating interest in a particular historical topic. However, it can also raise tension. The most recent example of a historical film dividing movie-goers and politicians equally is Yimou Zhang’s Flowers of War, a study of the atrocities committed by invading Japanese forces in Nanjing, China in 1937. The film claims to depict “the rape of Nanjing”, which is how the event is referred to in China, whose experts claim at least 300,000 civilians were brutally slaughtered. Yet, many Japanese historians and politicians do not acknowledge that a massacre took place in Nanjing, rather suggesting that the people that died were legitimate casualties of war. Considering the traditional enmity between the two nations such cultural productions carry an added political burden. Whether The Flowers of War can be considered a propaganda film is open to interpretation. Most impartial historians agree that a massacre did take place at Nanjing in 1937, but there is no consensus on the number of civilians killed given the lack of documentation and ruining power of war.

There is still no consensus as to how many people died at Nanjing in 1937

Perhaps the reason The Flowers of War has received added attention from the world’s media is because of its release date. 2011 is the ninetieth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and its officials have marked it accordingly. Aside from brash naval displays and military parades, a number of overtly political films have been released. Sanping Han’s The Founding of a Party, starring famous actors like John Woo and Andy Lau, chronicles the events leading up to the CCP’s creation. Meanwhile, Jackie Chan’s 1911 depicts the Xinhai Revolution of that year, which saw the end of the Qing Dynasty and would set in motion the events that led to the rise of the CCP. Both these films have been criticised for their lack of historical accuracy and pro-Communist stance. Similarly in 2009, during the sixtieth anniversary of the CCP’s rise to power at the expense of the nationalist Kuomintang, Sanping Han’s The Founding of a Republic was released. Featuring a host of nationally-known actors, the film has also been derided as a propaganda piece for the ruling party.

Here lies the problem of historical films. Whilst they have the power to captivate and inform, they are often used to popularise a particular, controversial message. Perhaps more worryingly for the historical profession, filmmakers are happy to manipulate factual evidence if it means creating a more exciting story. To then say that the film in question is “based on true events” is more misleading than an overt propaganda piece. There is thus a difference between clearly-discernible propaganda films and historically manipulative films which both have an adverse affect on the educative powers of history.


Overt Propaganda Films

From its conception, cinema has been used for propaganda purposes. One need only watch D.W. Griffith’s 1915 silent epic Birth of a Nation, with its denigrating portrayal of the African-American race and glorification of the Ku Klux Klan to see the early manipulative power of film. Indeed, the second incarnation of the Klan grew significantly in popularity in the period after the film’s release, showing the direct links between propaganda movies and social events. The reason the film’s message was so influential was because it was excellently made, on a grand scale and using techniques never before seen in the cinema. This would be a recurring feature of early propaganda films.

Black legislators - portrayed by white actors in blackface - were portrayed as drunk and ignorant

Sergei Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin (1925) is widely regarded as one of the greatest ever films, from both the silent and sound era. Using fast editing, dramatic acting and a plethora of extras, the film depicts the mutiny aboard the said battleship during Russia’s disastrous naval defeat to Japan during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. The political message comes from the fact that the ship’s incompetent and barbaric officers are part of the Tsarist elite, whereas the brutalised sailors are clearly working-class. Furthermore, the famous massacre scene on the Odessa Steps, when innocent civilians supporting the mutineers are mowed down by the guns of royal soldiers, is a clear sign of the ruthless, autocratic nature of Tsarist rule. This message was something the Communist Party perpetually emphasised throughout their cultural depictions, even after the 1917 revolution gave them power. Eisenstein therefore helped solidify the “enemy” in the people’s minds as the petty bourgeoisie and Tsarist remnants that were depicted so menacingly in his film.

Perhaps the epitome of the brilliant director/propagandist was Leni Riefenstahl. A filmmaker of great daring, capable of arousing fierce emotions through sweeping camera angles and dramatic displays of pomp and reverence, she became an integral part of the Nazi propaganda machine. Her Triumph of the Will (1935), depicting the Nazi Party Congress of 1934 in Nuremburg is a cinematic masterpiece. Stunning aerial shots, long focus lenses, thrilling music and exemplary editing of the Nazi leaders’ speeches create a spectacle of raw power. Those watching at the time would have found it difficult to dismiss the Nazi message of a return to German greatness. It remains the finest propaganda film ever made and, despite its overt support of the Nazis, was not dismissed as such.

One of many awe-inspiring stills from Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will

Any attempts today to present a similar message through film struggles to succeed. For a start, Riefenstahl’s success offers a stark reminder of the detrimental role film can play on one’s emotions and reasoning. People have become more wary of such presentiments. Additionally, despite its overt nature, The Triumph of the Will still possessed a subtlety in its message. It let the footage speak for itself. No need for a voiceover or dramatic reconstructions by actors; just a powerful message from a powerful party in an arena of mass jubilation. When looking at Sanping Han’s recent propaganda efforts for the CCP, they pale in comparison. Overly-explicit dialogue, coupled with blatant historical revisionism, means the films possess none of the subtlety of the earlier propaganda cinema. Rather, they offer a rather embarrassing spectacle that serves to diminish the CCP’s reputation rather than enhance it.

That is not to say that effective propaganda films do not still exist. Michael Moore’s documentaries are a fine example. For instance, his Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004) presented a completely prejudiced account of the Bush administration’s response to the Twin Tower attacks, using cleverly-scripted voiceovers to give an impression of gross incompetence on the Republican government’s part. Yet, the politicians targeted were given no opportunity to expand on their decisions through interview. The film being released shortly before the 2004 US Presidential Election was surely no coincidence, as campaigns to remove Bush began in earnest in democratic circles. Moore’s “ultra-liberalism” is therefore as potentially dangerous to the historical record of events and people as any other propaganda film message. This did not stop Moore from being showered with awards for his clearly biased portrayal of a watershed event in global history.

Moore's much-heralded film was a sinister propaganda piece

The history of film is thus infused with propaganda pieces, ranging widely in their effectiveness and subtlety. The best films of this nature are invariably those made by pioneering directors who used cinematic techniques to sidetrack the audience from the more radical elements of a particular message. When Riefenstahl portrayed Hitler at Nuremburg people got the impression of a man of great power and leadership, rather than concerning themselves with what he was actually saying. Whether we are historians or not, we should always be wary of overt propaganda pieces in film. They may often appear phoney and unbelievable, but their appeal to emotion is a powerful mass weapon.

Historical Inaccuracies in Film

In contrast to overt propaganda movies, which willingly distort the truth for political effect, other history films alter fact in the name of fiction. This may seem a harmless enough procedure given that the purpose of movies is to entertain. However, when depicting real events and real people, one must be careful not to portray their fictitious versions as a definitive characterisation of the original. Too often history films claiming to be based on archival research and academic advice fall somewhat short of scholarly accuracy, making them just as misleading, if not as politically potent, as deliberate propaganda films.

A recent example of this historical perversion in film comes from The King’s Speech (2010) by Tom Hooper. Focusing on King George VI’s difficulties in overcoming a debilitating stutter with the help of an Australian speech therapist, the film suggests “Bertie” struggled for years to overcome his problem. It is even shown in the film that the impediment had not been brought under control by the time World War Two began, seven years after George VI acceded to the throne. In reality, Bertie’s stammer had been overcome in the space of a few months in the 1920s, before he was king. It also offers a rather debatable characterisation of King Edward VIII, who abdicated in favour of Bertie, and the royal family’s political involvement in general. Such changes for the sake of drama may seem trivial to the average movie-goer. Yet they irk historians. In a profession keen to improve its engagement with the public at large, such movies play a detrimental role in historical education. As with the propaganda films, the power of cinema makes the events being viewed seem believable, meaning more people are likely to take their historical cues from a film rather than a well-researched book. When politicians and social theorists continue to emphasise the importance of having an appreciation for one’s national history, such films hamper the process of awareness.

Colin Firth as King George VI - The King's Speech was entertaining but historically misleading

Biographical dramas are particularly vulnerable to historical alteration. Making a movie about a boring, unpleasant or uninteresting individual is hardly going to have people flocking to the cinema. Therefore, mythologizing becomes a reality of these films. Take Amadeus (1984) by Milos Forman for instance. Yes, it was based on the play of the same name by Peter Schaffer, thus hinting at its fictionalised nature. Yet the film still claimed to be based on real events. Which parts are real are naturally not elaborated upon. Therefore, with Tom Hulce portraying Mozart as a childish buffoon whose demise is brought about by the scheming of F. Murray Abraham’s insanely-jealous Antonio Salieri, we have a film whose only historical accuracy is the names used. How such seemingly innocent historical misinterpretations come to be taken as fact by so many is brilliantly highlighted by an episode of The Simpsons. In “Margical History Tour”, Marge Simpson takes the liberty of enlightening her children about the life and works of Mozart. However, as Lisa quickly points out, Marge’s “history lesson” is based on the movie Amadeus rather than real historical events, to which Marge acts dismissively. Therefore, though it is unlikely that Forman wanted to mislead people over Mozart’s history, it is surprising how easily popular culture is taken at face value, particularly when a film begins with the fated words “based on true events”. From King Arthur to William Wallace, Michael Collins to J. Edgar Hoover, people from history are “dressed-up” for a wider audience. Though directors quickly point out after the film that they never intended their works to be completely historically accurate, they are happy enough for you to believe that they are while you are watching them.

Tom Hulce clowning around as Mozart in Amadeus

This may seem like a petty attack on a popular medium which provides entertainment to many and spruces up the dull aspects of history. Yet the fact remains that, whether it is desirable or not, history is often far less glamorous than it is portrayed on screen. Such portrayals lead to misunderstandings, inaccurate nationalist convictions, and a devaluing of proper historical research. They may not be as blatant as the overt propaganda films of the Nazis or the Chinese government flunkies but in their own way contribute to the misrepresentation of history and reality in the public domain.

Radical Revival?: economic depression and political extremism

With persistent panic and media scaremongering over the “Eurozone crisis”, coupled with genuinely unstable global financial conditions, the economic malaise of the past few years looks set to deteriorate once again.

Historically, periods of economic hardship have been accompanied by an increase in popularity for extremist politics. The most obvious example to cite is the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany after hyperinflation and the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Yet, many other examples from the twentieth century exist. Therefore, with several prominent economic analysts and doomsayers claiming the current “crisis” as the worst since 1929, are we seeing, or going to see, a revival of mainstream radical politics?

This article shall endeavour to answer this question by comparing historical precedents with contemporary trends. Particular attention shall be given to the three main reasons why people have historically looked towards extremist politics during times of economic woe. Namely, the offer of a radical alternative to the centrist parties widely regarded as culpable for economic collapse; the use and denigration of scapegoats to direct the anger of the economically oppressed; and the presence of charismatic leaders, whose populism rather than policies lifts people in times of gloom.

In an attempt to offer a broad spectrum of political extremism, historical examples shall be taken from revolutionary Russia, Nazi Germany, and Spain during the Civil War.

Political extremism as an alternative to centrist parties

A period of sustained economic malaise is often seen by the people as a failure of the political system to protect their interests. When that system is well-established, with traditional powers of hierarchy and bureaucracy, a change is usually deemed necessary. Whether this just means the election of a new party into the existing corridors of power or an upheaval of the system itself often depends on the severity of the crisis.

In pre-1917 Russia, the imperialist Tsars of the Romanov dynasty had held power for several centuries, governing in an autocratic and apolitical fashion. The emancipation of the serfs in 1861 had done little to improve the lot of the Russian peasantry, many of whom gradually migrated to the growing urban centres in the hope of finding work. There they were exposed to radical new political ideas, which advocated an overthrow of the existing Tsarist system as a means of alleviating the poverty and mistreatment of the common man. The Communists, led by the charismatic exile Vladimir Lenin, saw the persistence of monarchical rule and its loyal servants as the reason for the mass impoverishment of the Russian people. In 1917, during a period of acute starvation and destitution during the First World War, the people finally embraced this new left-wing ideology as their saviour and overthrew the Tsarist regime. When once before the revered status of the Tsars may have prevented mass politicisation and agitation amongst the working class, now was the time for change. With Russia having been dragged into a brutal war by the monarchy and its economy all but destroyed, the peasantry sought the radical overthrow of the existing system to be replaced with an extreme form of government.

Bolshevik forces march on Red Square during the 1917 Revolution

Whilst not as revolutionary in terms of political upheaval, the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany also resulted from an unprecedented downturn in economic conditions. Having held onto power during the hyperinflation years between 1921 and 1924, during which Hitler’s failed Munich Putsch occurred, the Weimar Republic appeared to enter a more stable economic phase where it had staved off the rise of extremist politics. The new Rentenmark currency and American loans papered over the cracks for several years. However, the Wall Street Crash of 1929 resulted in the US calling for its loans to be repaid and revealed the massive structural debt of the country as a whole, and that of its struggling citizens in particular. This worsened economic environment gave Hitler and the Nazi Party the platform they needed to orchestrate the overthrow of the Weimar regime, which was quickly being regarded as overly-archaic and bureaucratic by the German population. Whilst Hitler worked within the existing political system for several years, during which support for the extremist Nazi vision rose steadily, on being appointed Chancellor he seized his opportunity to dismantle the Weimar regime and establish a dictatorship. The reason such a momentous manoeuvre was even possible was because of the population’s detestation of a political establishment that had not only surrendered to the Allies at the end of the First World War, but led them into an economic climate that made mere survival a struggle.

Thrown into a similarly undesirable economic situation after 1929, Spain saw an explosion of radical politics and contradictory ideologies gain popularity in the early 1930s. Unlike with the Communists in Russia and the Nazis in Germany, no one political grouping received majority public support in Spain after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1931. The Second Spanish Republic that replaced the monarchy was at first welcomed as a progressive change to a traditionalist institution associated with the financial strife of the country. However, when it soon became clear that the new Socialist-Republican government was unable to reverse the economic woe, the various political factions that had developed during the unpopular monarchical period gained in prominence. For the conservatives, fascists and military factions, the democratic reforms embedded in the new Spanish constitution of 1931 were too left-leaning and represented an undesirable break with the traditional values of the past. For the communist and anarchist factions that had also surged in popularity, the reforms did not go far enough to overthrow the hated political and economic system. Consequently, an unstoppable process of factional rivalry evolved in a bid to eliminate the centrist politics of Spain along widely diverging ideological lines. Without the economic depression and monarchical inefficiency after the First World War, these factions may not have arisen with such popularity. However, such was the desire to overthrow the system held responsible for imparting these troubling times on the people that wildly-different groups of radicals emerged in a process that would lead to civil war.

As of yet, Europe has not succumbed to political upheaval on this level, which was a result of the bitter economic legacy left by the First World War and the Wall Street Crash. However, that is not to say that radical politics have not once more taken root in certain countries, albeit within the existing political systems. The largely centrist and moderate parties that led Europe’s leading countries through the years of economic boom no longer command the sort of respect they once did, whilst more marginal groupings have begun to make political ground.

Since the global economic downturn of 2008, more radical political parties have made progress within the parliamentary system. In Scandinavia, for instance, the True Finns and Danish People’s Party, both considered as socially right-wing, have become the third largest parties in their respective countries. The Slovak National Party, which many critics deem as having ultranationalist tendencies, now forms part of that country’s coalition government. Even in Great Britain, the British National Party won two seats in the European Parliament in 2010, despite its overtly extreme policies. Whilst none of these parties can consider themselves to have the support of the majority of their country’s population, this “turn to the right” in Europe has alarmed some analysts, given the historical link between economic depression and extremist politics.

The response to the True Finns parliamentary success was not entirely appreciated

Fortunately, there has yet to be any sustained extra-parliamentary movements against existing political systems in Europe. This was the phenomenon that made the Nazi Party and the Russian Communists so dangerous and contributed to the civil strife in 1930s Spain. Whilst large-scale demonstrations and riots have been evident in many European cities over enforced austerity measures, Athens being the most obvious example, they have not been tied to any extremist political movements. However, the potential for radical politicians to exploit such public anger is a cause for concern.

Even in the USA, a country that prides itself on its liberal and democratic principles, the right-wing has made a revival. The Tea Party movement, associated with ultra-conservative social beliefs and Christian evangelism, has become such a prominent force in American politics that the current nominees for the Republican presidential candidacy have had to pander to their desires. All the leading contenders have set out their stance as anti-abortion, anti-gay marriage candidates who favour massive tax cuts despite the economic situation. This is an example of how radical political groupings, no matter what their size, can influence public opinion to such an extent that leading political parties have to alter their stance. Thus the potential exists for traditionally centrist parties to take more radical policy lines simply as a means of retaining power, rather than allowing their votes to be subsumed by more marginal and extreme groups. Whilst no threat is currently posed to the existing political systems of the Western World, another economic downturn could see radical politics infiltrating traditional power structures, which could have a significant impact on society.

Scapegoats for economic depression

A further reality of an economic depression is that people naturally look for a person, or group, to blame for the unwanted situation. Very often, large swathes of the population neglect to factor in the geopolitical circumstances in which an economic downturn has occurred, or remain ignorant to the fact that they have been outliving their means. Whatever the situation is, people look for scapegoats. This tendency is consequently exploited by ruthless political parties seeking to popularise their radical ideas.

In revolutionary Russia, the Communists sought to exploit existing class-based tensions to make the “rich” the culprits for the mass impoverishment that existed amongst the lower classes. Never mind the fact that Russia was immersed in a brutal war and had suffered consecutive years of atrocious weather and bad harvests; the aristocracy and bourgeoisie were presented as the economic oppressors. Through effective propaganda, and the harnessing of existing distrust between the classes, the Communists convinced a majority of the working population that the bourgeoisie were the unscrupulous minions of the capitalist elite, seeking to squeeze every penny from the poor through their ownership of the means of production. As a result, the Communists engineered sufficient support against a shared enemy, which helped lead to the 1917 revolution and the murder of the Romanov rulers. Not only that, but during the subsequent establishment of the Communist state, hundreds of thousands of “bourgeois” collaborators were sent to the GULAGs or executed by state-sponsored death squads. Countless other professionals from the Tsarist period fled into exile, where their talents were put to good use. Whilst some of the bourgeoisie undoubtedly increased the burden of the poor through the imposition of low wages and long hours, to discriminate so freely against an indeterminate proportion of the population was a ploy of the Communist exploitation of the economic depression. Without it, their creation of a repressive state may have proved impossible.

With regards to Germany, the scapegoats for the post-war depression were not class defined, but race defined. After 1929 the Nazis accelerated their anti-Semitic propaganda campaigns, exploiting traditional anti-Semitic beliefs in the country and the status of Jews as the chief money-lenders and financiers of Germany. Rather than focusing on their industriousness, the Nazis pointed to Jewish greed and economic subversion which resonated with millions of Germans desperate to pin the blame for their destitution on a tangible entity. How anti-Semitism degraded to such horrifying levels is still difficult to comprehend. Yet the Nazis, and Hitler in particular, seized their chance to portray the Jews as the economic enemies of the people, from which developed their more renowned ideologies regarding racial impurity and physical degeneration. Again, without that particular economic climate that existed after the Wall Street Crash, compounding the misery of war reparations, it is unlikely the Nazi Party would have been able to ride to power on predominantly anti-Jewish sentiment. By identifying the Jews as the cause of economic woe, the Nazis had a ready-made solution to fix the problem: eliminate the Jewish presence in society.

This Nazi propaganda poster from 1932 links Jews with the development of capitalism, communism, and socialism.

Because of the confused state of Spanish society and politics in the 1930s, a number of economic scapegoats were identified by equally-persuasive factional groups. This unique situation helped contribute to the beginning of a civil war, rather than a dictatorship. For the socialist and communist radicals, the monarchical legacy of rich landowners and patronised nobles created an endemic economic weakness that the majority of the population suffered under. As with the Russian revolutionaries, their attribution of blame was class-based. For the extreme left-wing anarchists, on the other hand, it was the political establishment in general that was the culprit for economic depression. In perhaps the most popular anarchist movement in history, the state itself was targeted as a useless entity that engendered mismanagement of funds and the impoverishment of workers.

On the right of the political spectrum, meanwhile, the conservative military saw the agitation of the workers as the cause for economic struggle in itself. Rather than working at full capacity, they were deemed to be preoccupied with counter-productive protests, supported by a socialist-led government that upset traditional hierarchies. The extreme-right Falange, the Spanish Fascists organised in 1933, held the left-leaning government in even greater contempt. Yearning for a return to state intervention and planning, as well as the nationalisation of key industries, the Falange saw Bolshevism as the cause of economic meltdown. They detested the infiltration of foreign ideologies, which they believed heightened agitation amongst the workers. In a country with low levels of foreign immigration, any outsider was considered a subversive by the Falangists, who demanded the return of a strong Spain. Perhaps most bizarre of all these factions, however, were the Carlists. With their supporters largely congregated in the agricultural north of the country, the Carlists were ultra-traditionalist Catholics who deemed modernity itself as the economic enemy. Distrusting any ideological strand of thought, from liberalism to communism, the Carlists called for the return of a Bourbon monarchy, which they believed the only sound form of government. With so many well-supported factions identifying their own scapegoats for the economic troubles of Spain, a “blame culture” developed within the Iberian nation that led to a confrontation of society on the grandest scale. It was a unique event in history, borne out of the economic circumstances of the time.

So, who is to blame for the current economic crisis in the Western world? Have political groups identified their own scapegoats? Thus far, blame has largely been restricted to individual political parties within the democratic systems of the West. Unlike in the post-1929 era, there has been little significant parliamentary challenge to traditional methods of rule. Governments have been toppled, but the system has remained in place. Rather, the causes of our current economic struggle have largely been seen as three-fold: 1) The greed of bankers and the failure of the banking system; 2) the apathy and expense of the ‘Welfare State’; 3) the over-bureaucratisation of society.

Public anger at the economy has largely been directed towards bankers

Unlike in the past, these perceived contributors to economic criminality cannot be easily-defined as targetable groups. Yes, protests have been launched in most capital cities against bankers’ bonuses and unsafe lending. But is anyone really suggesting getting rid of bankers? If so, it would be a minority. For the reality is, we need them now more than ever. As for those benefitting from the ‘Welfare State’, they are typically the people who have been the driving-force of radical politics in the past. Because the poorer classes suffer most during economic depression, they are often those most tempted by radical alternatives, and take heart from the identification of scapegoats. But when they themselves are the scapegoats for economic waste, there is unlikely to be the same level of enthusiasm for changing the system. Bureaucrats too are difficult to single-out because of their close ties with the existing political establishment, which is not yet under serious threat.

However dissatisfied some people might be, the level of anger directed against the contemporary political and economic systems is not comparable to the early twentieth century. Equally, there does not seem to be a shared opposition to particular societal groups, as there was against the Jews in Nazi Germany for instance.

It is true that the people of the Scandinavian nations have shown a degree of general mistrust towards foreign immigrants into what are their traditionally homogenous societies. This may explain the rise in popularity in right-wing political parties there. However, as of yet, none of these groups threatens to take control of the country. Meanwhile, individual acts of terror by right-wing lunatics like Anders Behring Breivik are often highlighted as an example of a society becoming infused with extremist ideologies. Yet, as with the recent discovery of a vicious neo-Nazi cell in Germany, these are one-off incidents. They are not linked to a wider mass movement that threatens political control, as was the case in the turbulent days of post-WWI.

Populist Leaders

Perhaps the most obvious absence from today’s economic climate compared to the past is that of the populist leader. Historically, economic downturns have offered charismatic, radical politicians the opportunity to spread the appeal of their particular ideologies. With people far more willing to listen to extremist ideas during periods when mainstream policy is deemed to have failed them, the more opportunistic leaders take their chance through utilising their own personal appeal.

In pre-revolutionary Russia, the Communist Party was effective in championing the personal virtues of Lenin, even when he was consigned to exile. Such an aura was developed around his persona that when he returned to Russia in April 1917, Lenin was revered as a saviour of the people. Exploiting this chance, Lenin outlined his most radical vision of communism to date in his ‘April theses’, using his persuasive public speaking powers to secure his popular mandate. The combined effects of his exploits, real and imagined, coupled with effective propaganda ensured Lenin was able to direct the building of the new communist state, a monumental challenge given the departure from monarchical rule.

Lenin charismatically directed the anger of the masses

Whilst Lenin was a great speech-maker, Adolf Hitler was unsurpassable as an orator. His well-orchestrated, powerful speeches became a hallmark of Nazi rule and earned him the support of large swathes of the German population who might otherwise have been repulsed by his outlandish policies. As with Lenin, and later Joseph Stalin, Hitler was popularised further by an effective propaganda campaign, in his case directed by Joseph Goebbels. The “Hitler Myth” as it has come to be known, portrayed Hitler as a demi-God come to rescue the German people from economic disaster and Jewish subversion. Hitler’s populism played on people’s emotions rather than their reason, a ploy that would not have had the same success during a time of economic stability.

Hitler's oratory power captivated millions

Part of the reason Spain fell into rival factional groups of similar strength in the 1930s was because of the prevalence of populist leaders. From Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, the leader of the fascist Falangists, who relied on martial pomp and extensive political writing; to Dolores Ibárruri, known as La Pasionaria (passion flower), who spearheaded the Communist Party with matriarchal strength that attracted men and women alike; to General Francisco Franco, whose authoritarian nature and championing of a “nationalist patriotic” cause enabled him to mobilise millions of supporters during the Civil War even though he had no political policies or experience to speak of, charismatic leaders existed. They ruthlessly took advantage of the impoverishment of large segments of the population to turn Spaniards against one another in the hope that this would lead to their empowerment. The bloodshed that reigned in Spain between 1936 and 1939 is testament to the various leaders’ powers of persuasion.

La Pasionaria was a Communist inspiration in impoverished Spain

Contemporary politics in the West is not exhibiting this trend of increasing numbers of populist leaders that occurred during the economic hardships of the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, it could be argued that few of today’s leaders are anything more than moderates, who prefer drawn-out negotiations to radical action. Just look at the ongoing wrangling in Europe. This perhaps explains why radical politics has largely been kept away from the mainstream despite the economic climate in which extreme ideologies might appeal.

Some current examples of populist politicians do exist, however. Timo Soini, leader of the True Finns, utilised his “brain, wit and charisma” to popularise his radical brand of Eurosceptic, nationalist politics so that he was the most voted-for candidate in the 2011 Finnish parliamentary elections. A contrasting example would be Silvio Berlucsoni, whose inexplicable retention of power amidst public scandal and huge national debt in Italy was largely a result of his unique brand of populist politics. Yet, when you think of Lenin, Hitler, Mussolini, or even Franco, there are no contemporary equals in the West. This will no doubt please the majority of readers, though it is somewhat of a surprise considering our supposedly awful economic predicament.

Today’s reality

This essay has tried to demonstrate that, despite many analysts claiming us to be in an economic depression comparable to the post-WWI period, extremist politics has not taken route in contemporary Western society as it did in the 1920s and ‘30s. The reasons for this are two-fold.

Firstly, notions of democracy and liberal values are far more entrenched in today’s Western world. After WWI, democracy was still a largely-distrusted political ideology that cannot be said to have been well-established anywhere, with the possible exception of the US. Consequently, the departure to radical politics in a time of economic want was not as great as it would be today, when democracy has become an accepted norm of the Western political system. Therefore, when looking for economic scapegoats, it is far harder for extremist parties to create a blame consensus towards a specific group of people when all men are considered equal in liberal-democratic societies. Such was not the case with the Jews in Nazi Germany or the bourgeoisie in Russia, when the possibility of racial and social inferiority was readily accepted.

The second reason why extremist politics are not flourishing at present is because the current economic depression has been frequently over-exaggerated by the Western media and opposition political parties. To compare our current economic status with the 1930s is absurd and, whilst people undoubtedly have to exercise more thrift in their daily affairs, this latest “crisis” is self-made. The horrific consequences of WWI created an endemic economic weakness in the Western world that could not be countered. Today’s malaise has largely resulted from greedy bankers, over-spending politicians and our own individual tendencies to live beyond our means and accumulate debt. The reason extremist politics don’t appeal to most today is because individuals know that they are largely to blame for their own situation. It is they that need to change, not the system. Analysts and “experts” need to be careful when they compare our current luxury to the destitution and terror of the 1930s.