Turkmen Elections Offer Hopes of Change: political development initiated

The Turkmen people were not meant to be tamed, beholden to anyone or anything other than the land. Nomads of determination and skill, the Turkmen of history were notoriously difficult to conquer. Seljuks, Mongols and Uzbeks failed to subject them into an acquiescent bondage.

The open mountain plains of Turkmenistan have a long history of nomadism, trade and war
The open mountain plains of Turkmenistan have a long history of nomadism, trade and war

As soldiers, horsemen and traders, the Turkmen formed an influential constituent part of successive dynasties and Khanates. Brought into service they may have been, but the Turkmen retained an autonomy of character which only Russia would end.

In the 19th century the conquests began; striking out from the Caspian Sea, the Tsarist forces achieved what no civilization had achieved before. The nomadic Turkmen were tamed. 1881: the Battle of Geok Tepe confirms Russian victory.

Russian forces lay siege to Geok Tepe during the 'Great Game'
Russian forces lay siege to Geok Tepe during the ‘Great Game’

Since this point, the Turkmen people have been subject to the whims and demands of a select group of people. First, it was the bureaucrats of the Tsarist imperialists; then it was the stooges of the Soviet Union, the eloquently titled General Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic.

The last of these scions of Moscow was Saparmurat Atayevich Niyazov. Eccentric, deranged, impulsive, Niyazov became the first President of an independent Turkmenistan. Surely the years of subjection and repression were over? Not so; bloodthirsty meglomaniac that he was, Niyazov drove the Turkmen people further into the ground. Renaming months after his family, commissioning hideously overpriced artworks of his bloated figure, he ruled for personal pleasure.

His successor, the laboriously named Gurbanguly Mälikgulyýewiç Berdimuhamedow, dispensed with the cult of personality and vulgar cultural works but his authoritarian control of the Turkmen was undimmed. In 2012 he was re-elected with 97% of the vote.

On Sunday, multi-party parliamentary elections were held for the first time. Yes, the contesting parties were all government sanctioned; yes, it may be a ruse to detract attention from Turkmenistan’s undemocratic state; yes, it may be an attempt to attract foreign investment.

A rubber stamp for the government it may be but turnout for the Turkmen elections were high; people yearn for political participation
A rubber stamp for the government it may be but turnout for the Turkmen elections were high; people yearn for political participation

To simply dismiss this development, however, would be naive. Political development is a slow process. Democratic change does not simply occur overnight, despite the desperate hopes and beliefs of the Western world. Look at Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt and Libya; overthrowing authoritarianism and replacing it with democracy is too destabilising.

Initiating political change, however limited, is the key starting point. Think of the Great Reform Act of 1832 in the United Kingdom. Changes to the electoral system and the franchise were limited, supposed to appease the agitators without giving anything away, yet they set in motion a lengthy political process that ended with universal suffrage. People get encouraged by change, it makes them hungry for more.

For the Turkmen people, it has been a long time coming. Indentured nomads, they yearn for freedom. Do not be surprised to see the streets of Ashgabat bedecked with the demands of a people destined to seize this sliver of hope.

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Purges in North Korea: the route to security or instability?

The decision by North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong-Un to execute his chief advisor and uncle, Jang Song-Taek, has led to considerable speculation as to what this will do to the security of the isolationist country and the Northeast Asia region in general.

The purge of Jang (right) has led to fears of increased insecurity on the Korean Peninsula
The purge of Jang (left) has led to fears of increased insecurity on the Korean Peninsula

At his father Kim Jong-Il’s funeral in December 2011, Kim Jong-Un walked beside the leader’s the coffin flanked by seven men. These were designated regents, dubbed the ‘gang of seven’, chosen by the late Kim to provide advice to his son, the fledgling dictator. After Jang Song-Taek’s execution, only two of these men remain in office. Kim Jong-Un’s purges send out a signal; he is the man in charge and will be held accountable to no person, whatever sound judgement they may provide.

It has been suggested that Kim Jong-Un’s purge of Jang is a sign of impulsiveness, bordering on weakness, which marks the young dictator’s desperation to be seen as the sole arbiter of North Korea’s future. This sign of weakness, it is argued, may embolden potential agitators to manoevure Kim from power, potentially sparking factional infighting within the North Korean Workers’ Party and thus destabilising the Korean Peninsula as a whole.

Despite the apparent suddenness and brutality of the purge, however, Kim is merely following in the footsteps of his father who overcame his own obstacles en route to consolidating his authoritarian position.

Even before the death of North Korea’s revered founder, Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il (his son) was ousting potential rivals and usurpers from the political scene. In October 1992, he purged 20 military officers whose loyalty to the regime was in doubt, sacking a further 300.

After succeeding his father, who died in July 1994, Kim Jong-Il instigated further purges. In April 1995, he removed and executed the entire officer corps of the Sixth Army, apparently issuing death warrants for several hundred other soldiers on tenuous accusations of treason.

The reclusive Kim Jong-Il purged officials and military officers throughout his reign
The reclusive Kim Jong-Il purged officials and military officers throughout his reign

During a time of high famine in 1997, Kim publicly executed his agricultural minister, along with several hundred other officials, as a means of deflecting criticism of his handling of the economy. He followed this in 2000 with another purge of senior political figures for “alienating the party from the masses and playing into the enemy’s hands.”

Even Jang Song-Taek, Kim’s brother-in-law and the man at the centre of the current debate, was dismissed from his party posts in 2004, although he was later reinstated.

If there was ever any inkling that an individual was becoming too powerful, or had designs on undermining the all-powerful Kim dynasty, he was swiftly brought to book, along with anybody unfortunate enough to have links with the said individual.

Past loyalty was irrelevant; paranoia and suspicion remained essential characteristics for Kim in his bid to retain dominance over the country. His willingness to purge people, often executing them subsequently, led to the failure of many policies and the imposition of incompetents in positions of power.

That in itself, however, prevented any significant challenge to Kim’s rule and consequently denied the possibility for the sort of infighting that could lead to the violent breakdown of the one-family dynasty, a scenario most Western diplomats are terrified about.

By initiating his own purges, Kim Jong-Un might encourage his potential opponents to overthrow him whilst any chance remains. It is more likely, however, that his ruthless decision-making will consolidate his rule, as was the case with his father. It might lead to the execution of many innocent people, but such a policy will also root out potential usurpers.

Kim Jong-Un's preservation of his family dynasty is reliant on a policy of purging
Kim Jong-Un’s preservation of his family dynasty is reliant on a policy of purging

This means continuing misery for the North Korean people, destined to live lives of impoverished brutality under the Stalinist regime. Simultaneously, however, it reduces the risk of an internal rupture within the North Korean Worker’s Party. As such, the chances of a bloody civil war in a nuclear-armed country are decreased rather than the feared reverse.